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Empirical evidence and theoretical work on characteristics of
potential taxpayers who do not file tax returns and their incentives
structure is limited. Yaniv (1988), is the major theoretical analysis of non-
filing. His main conclusion with respect to filing behaviour is that those
whose taxes are withheld may evade more out of income not subject to
withholding. He, however, makes no distinction between filing but
reporting zero income and non-filing so that, implicitly, non-filers are a
subset of those who do not report any taxable income other than income
from which taxes are withheld. Crane and Nourzad (1994), examine
characteristics of former non-filers who participated in a 1986 filing
amnesty in the state of Michigan in the United States. They find a
positive correlation between income and filing and between tax
withholding and filing. The latter is contrary to Yaniv's theoretical
prediction. Erard and Ho (1995) analyse an invaluable US Internal
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Revenue Service data set on non-filers. These “ghosts” largely consist of
manual, sales and service sector workers and creative arts workers. The
authors point to these activities being largely in the “informal sector” in
the US.
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For India, Aggarwal (1991), used third party data sources on 4
individual characteristics, ownership of phones, cars or homes and the
size of monthly electricity bills, to identify potential non-filers in Faridabad
city. Comparing his data to income tax records, he estimated that 89
percent of potential taxpayers did not file returns. The information at
Aggarwal's disposal did not enable him to adequately refine his estimate
of potential non-filers who are possibly over-estimated.
Given the paucity of information, there is currently no satisfactory
alternative to theoretical analysis of non-filing, especially for the Indian
income tax. A simple model of non-filing behaviour is developed here
and its predictions for non-filing behaviour in general and for Indian
income tax non-filers in 2000-01 examined. The model is developed in
the next section and equilibrium filing behaviour examined in section 3.
Comparative static properties are examined in section 4. Indian data and
estimates are in section 5. The aim of the numerical exercise is to
assess how well the model performs given Indian conditions and to
assess the magnitude of costs to non-filers and society of non-filing.
Section 6 concludes.
II. A Model of Non-Filing Behaviour in the
Presence of Compliance Costs and Tax
Withholding
The filing versus non-filing decision is likely to involve a
comparison of costs over several years. First, on being identified in
certain situations (e.g. during tax investigation or “search and seizure”
operations), tax departments typically assess taxes for several years, as
                                                       
1 Poapongsakorn et. al (2000), in their cost-benefit analysis of tax surveys to
detect non-filers present  information on stop-filer survival rates but do not
examine non-filer behaviour.5
is the case in India. So the decision to file or not will depend on an
individual's filing history. Second, the incidence of stop-filing is also of
relevance. Once a non-filer files, this raises the probability of his being
detected and penalised in the event of his choosing not to file in future,
since he is now on the rolls of the tax department.
2 Both these factors
raise the compliance cost of filing returns. While models of tax evasion in
the Allingham and Sandmo (1971) tradition do give rise to non-filing
behaviour, they do not adequately take into account the impact of
compliance costs on non-filing.
3 Though a model of annual filing is
developed here, variations in detection probabilities take care of the
second issue while assessment of taxes on income  and undeclared
wealth address the first problem. The formal model is now described.
It is assumed that individuals have differing amounts of wealth,
W. This can be invested either in the “formal sector”, which gives rise to
income RW, or in the “informal sector”, giving rise to an income rW. Total
labour supply is taken as given. R is taken as exogenous and identical
for all individuals.
4 Individuals are assumed to be risk neutral income
maximizers and heterogeneous with respect to informal investment
opportunities available, with r having a minimum value of zero and a
maximum value exceeding R. This implies that, even if they file tax
returns, they report zero taxable income assuming the standard
Allingham and Sandmo (1971) condition for tax evasion, p(1+p) < 1,
holds.
5 Here, p is the probability that tax evasion by filers is detected and
punished while  p is the rate of penalty assumed proportional to tax
                                                       
2 So, for example, Poapongsakorn et. al (2000) use an “average survival rate”
for new filers in their cost-benefit analysis of non-filer surveys in Thailand.
3 Models  of tax evasion with compliance costs include Alm (1988), Mayshar
(1991),  Slemrod (1994), and the models in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta
(2002), chapter 2. Hite (1989) presents evidence suggesting that lowering
compliance costs lowers non-compliance in general, though she does not
focus specifically on filing versus non-filing.
4 Wealth can include time and human capital endowments, so that, formally,
labour income is not neglected. In this case the penalty on non-filers will
only depend on the taxable fraction of undeclared wealth.
5 This simplifies the analysis while abstracting from reporting behaviour to
permit a sharp focus on under-reporting. The assumption biases the model
results in favour of filing.6
evaded.  Third party compliance requirements are also introduced
through the important channel of tax withholding (TDS or tax deduction
at source in Indian usage) identified by Yaniv (1988). For this, it is
assumed that if formal income RW exceeds a threshold, Z, then taxes
are withheld at rate s £ t.
6 Furthermore, for detected non-filers, a fixed
penalty, N, is levied. The fraction of wealth invested in the informal sector
is denoted by b. Post-tax income if evasion and non-filing is detected and
punished is denoted by YC and if undetected by YN. C denotes the net
compliance cost of filers. That is, it nets out any sacrifice a non-filer may
have to make to maintain a low profile, such as induced by the "1 in 6"
scheme in India in addition to any direct costs non-filers may incur.
7 With
this, there are three possible cases:
Case g (non-filers not subject to TDS or "ghosts", probability of detection
= p1):
YN = rWb + RW(1-b),   with RW(1-b) £ Z.
YC  = [rWb + RW(1-b)][1 – t(1+p)] - Wbt(1+p) – N
Case nt (non-filers subject to TDS, probability of detection = p2):
YN = rWb + RW(1-b)(1-s),   with RW(1-b) > Z
YC = rWb[1-t(1+p)] + RW(1-b)[1-s – (t-s)(1+p)] - Wbt(1+p) – N
Case f (filers, probability of detection = p):
YN = rWb + RW(1-b)(1-s) – C[RW(1-b)]
                                                       
6 For example, such a threshold is part of Indian income tax law with taxes
withheld at the lowest marginal tax rate. Due to lack of information sharing,
in practice, separate thresholds apply to each income yielding asset. In
addition income from some government bonds and also dividend income
are not subject to tax. These complications are not explicitly addressed.
Incorporation of many assets would reduce the positive impact of TDS on
filing but would complicate the model.
7 Under the “1 in 6 scheme”, filing is mandatory for individuals who have club
memberships, credit cards, or cellular phones, travelled abroad during the
year, or who own a house or a car. While detection of non-compliance with
this filing requirement is by no means fool-proof, and while the introduction
of this scheme led to a massive increase in filers, those who continue to
refrain from filing may have to sacrifice some of these filing “perks”. For a
press report on demand for credit cards being adversely affected by filing
requirements, see The Times of India, June 15, 2002, p15. Furthermore,
the newspaper report by Joshi (2002) claims that the 1 in 6 scheme has
“failed to achieve its objectives” with respect to rich individuals.7
YC = rWb[1-t(1+p)] + RW(1-b)[1-s – (t-s)(1+p)] - Wbt(1+p) – C[RW(1-b)]
There are four features worth noting about this specification.
First even for filers, 100 percent under-reporting is assumed. Second, as
discussed, in the event of detection, additional taxes and penalties are
assumed to be levied not only on informal income, rWb but also on
informal wealth Wb. Third, the direct compliance cost of filers is assumed
to be increasing (and concave) in income as empirical evidence in Das-
Gupta and Chattopadhyay (2002a) suggests. In the absence of
information on the opportunity cost of non-filers, it is assumed to be
proportional to direct costs, so that C is also concave. The probability of
detection is assumed to be lowest for ghosts, higher for non-filers who
are nevertheless subject to TDS, and highest for filers for relevant
ranges of wealth.
8 However, non-filing by the very wealthy individuals will
not go undetected, though evasion may continue. Though not
incorporated in the equations above, this is addressed in the analysis
below by introducing an upper bound on the wealth of non-filers. As
pointed out, the assumption of a relatively high probability of detection of
filers captures the increased probability of detection of future income for
individuals on the rolls of the tax department.
III. Non-Filing and Filing Behaviour
To analyse this model, (a) ranges of r for which individuals prefer
informal to formal investment and (b) individual preferences for each of
the three filing/non-filing regimes, must be determined. To do this
expected income functions are needed. These are given by:
Case g:  Eg = W[rb+R(1-b)][1 – p1t(1+p)] – p1[Wbt(1+p)+N]
                                                       
8 In India, filers not subject to TDS are required to pay advance tax. In this
case, s may be considered the rate of advance tax. The assumption is
then that the implicit rate of advance tax chosen by taxpayers is s, given
their intention of declaring no additional income in their return.
Complications arising from any difference in the TDS rate and the implicit
advance tax rate are ignored.8
Case nt: Ent = Wrb[1-p2t(1+p)] + WR(1-b)[1-s-p2(t-s)(1+p)] –
p2[Wbt(1+p)+N]
Case f:   Ef = Wrb[1-pt(1+p)] + WR(1-b)[1-s-p(t-s)(1+p)] – p[Wbt(1+p)] –
C[RW(1– b)]
These expected income functions are decreasing but convex in
compliance costs, so that investment in both formal and informal assets
can never be optimal. Differentiating these functions with respect to b, we
get the conditions for informal versus formal investment
 9:
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The values of r at which (1), (2) and (3) hold with equality are
denoted rg, rnt and rf(W) respectively. In case g, individuals preferring
formal investment must invest b0W in the informal sector if RW exceeds
Z in order to remain outside the TDS net. Furthermore, taxes and
penalties on detected informal wealth make informal investment
worthwhile only if r exceeds R by a margin which depends on p1 and CN.
In cases nt and f, this penalty is counteracted by terms which depend on
the TDS rate and compliance costs, so that informal investment may be
preferable even if r < R. However, since s is a fraction of t and R is taken
below to be 9 percent in numerical implementation below, this case is not
considered further here. Notice that the critical values of r in case f
depends positively on 
' C if r > R. Ranges of W for which, formal
investors prefer to file or subject themselves to TDS must now be
determined.
First consider Ef-Ent, with b = 0:
Ef-Ent = WR(p2-p)(t-s)(1+p) – C[RW] + p2N               (4)
                                                       
9 It is clear that, under our assumptions, filing for those who wish to avoid
TDS, i.e, case f with b = b0, can never be optimal.9
Since (4) is decreasing in RW, clearly, there exists RW
f, such
that Ent>Ef for RW > RW
f. So this implies that richer individuals prefer not
to file, given the lower probability of detection of income. The implication
of this model, that very rich individuals prefer not to file, is because the
model does not formally take account, for individuals already on the rolls
of the income tax administration, that non-filing will quickly be detected
with probability close to 1 even if detection of other forms of non-
compliance (e.g. tax evasion) remains difficult. In practice, there is,
therefore, likely to be a wealth level above which individuals always file.
More generally, at every wealth level there are likely to be relatively
visible individuals whose non-filing is likely to be discovered. It is
plausible that the proportion of such individuals is increasing in W. This is
taken account of in the numerical estimates below.
Now consider Ef – Eg with b=0 for Ef and b = b0 for Eg.
RW
1 [Ef – Eg] = [t(1+p)(p1-p) – s{1-p(1+p)}] –
RW
1 [C(RW) – p1N] +  R
0 b [p1t(1+p) + (R-r){1-p1t(1+p)}]    (5)
Notice that the coefficient of  b0 in square brackets is a
rearrangement of the condition for non-filing and informal investment to
be preferred in (1). So attention is restricted to the non-negative values
of this coefficient. This equation gives rise to interesting filing and non-
filing ranges with respect to RW:
(a) For very low RW, say RW £ RW
0, b0 = 0 and C(RW) is small. So
these individuals are filers. Since the income tax has an exemption
limit, these individuals can be ignored.
(b) Assuming that C(RW) exceeds p1N at some RW < Z,
10 non-filing is
preferred for RW
0 < RW <  RW
g, where RW
g > Z.
(c) Thereafter (5) defines a positively sloped boundary, r = f(R,W),
f(R,W
g) = 0, such that non-filing is preferred at values of r above the
boundary.
11 This is intuitively obvious, given the greater sacrifice
                                                       
10 This is likely given the extremely high and regressive compliance costs
found by Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a).
11  For a positive slope it suffices for RWp1N –ZC to be positive over the
relevant range. This is true for sufficiently large values of RW. Since N is
relatively small in the Indian context, this is assumed to be the case
throughout the relevant range.10
made due to the increase in  b0 with W and the falling average
compliance costs.
For the model to predict any filers at all, it must be the case that
RW
f > RW
g. This is assumed to be the case here and in the next section.
The upshot is that filers and non-filers are identified as in Figure
1 for the situation where rnt = R. Combinations of parameter values giving
rise to filing are shown by the lightly and heavily shaded areas in the
graph. A second case is illustrated in Figure 2, where the possibility of rf
intersecting the boundary r = f(R,W) is illustrated. In Figure 2, with initial
parameter values, only the lightly shaded areas are filing zones. The
impact of changes in C and the TDS regime on filing behaviour can now
be explored.
IV. Comparative Statics and Compliance Costs
of Non-Filers
The impact of higher C (that is, greater direct compliance costs
of filers or a smaller loss from non-filing) is, firstly, to shift RW
g and the r
= f(R,W) locus to the right. This occurs since, at any r, RW will have to be
higher to offset the additional cost. Second, RW
f shifts left to, say, RW
f'.
This is shown by dotted lines in Figure 1. The impact is to decrease the
range of parameters giving rise to filing to the heavily shaded area
labeled f' in Figure 1.
The impact of more stringent TDS (higher s and lower Z) on the r
= f(R,W) locus is indeterminate. However, RW
f shifts  right implying,
counter-intuitively, an increase in filers. This occurs because the
marginal loss to filers, who already have a high probability of detection,
p, is smaller than for non-filers.  This could be part of the explanation for
the empirical finding of Crane and Nourzad (1994). This is shown by the
dotted lines in Figure 2, assuming no change occurs in the r = f(R,W)
locus. The filing zone is shown by the heavily shaded area.11
The impact of removal of TDS (s=0 and Z not being binding) is,
firstly, to make case g coincide with Case nt and secondly to cause W
f to
shift leftward to W
0. In other words, filers will be restricted to those whose
probability of detection of non-filing is close to 1, who are not captured in
the model: No one else files tax returns.12
Thus, overall, TDS leads to lower non-filing, while higher filer compliance
costs lead to increased non-filing.
This model over-predicts non-filing for three reasons. First, due
to such activities as door-to-door survey by the tax department and
pursuit of stop-filers (i.e. those who are on the income tax rolls but stop
filing), there are individuals with RW < RW
1 for whom non-filing is
detected with high probability.
12 Second, risk aversion itself gives rise to
“psychic” non-filing costs, so that some risk averse individuals close to
                                                       
12 The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) (2001) reports that
124,283 premises were surveyed by the income tax department in 2000-01
with a further 105 cases of ostentatious expenditure being investigated.
However, no information is available about the number of non-filers
identified through these surveys. Furthermore, no data are available on the
“survival rate” of new income tax return filers. For an earlier evaluation of
income tax surveys, see Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998). Thai surveys
are examined in Poapongsakorn et. al (2000)13
RW
g and RW
f will file even if this entails a loss in expected income.
Third, honesty, guilt, shame and other cultural factors do play a role in
the filing/non-filing choice for at least some individuals.
13
V. A Crude Estimate of Income Tax  Compliance
Costs of Non-Filers in India
To measure non-filer compliance costs, two elements need to be
taken into account. First is the distortion in investment patterns induced
by TDS (or third party compliance requirements). Second, the direct and
opportunity cost of non-filers PjN  + C2(RW), j = 1,2, where C2, discussed
further below, is the non-filer opportunity cost of foregone consumption
benefits. The indirect compliance costs of third parties, however, need
not be taken account of, since TDS obligations are independent of filing
behaviour.
Assumed parameter values for estimates of non-filing
compliance costs are now described.
•  The distribution of RW is assumed to be the same as the National
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) estimates for 1996-
97 as reported by the Comptroller and Auditor General (2001).
However, the NCAER distribution is scaled upward for inflation here,
using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Non-Manual Workers
(CPIUNME), population growth and per capita income growth.
14
Cumulative inflation, population growth and per capita income growth
for 1996-97 to 2000-01 are 31.1 percent, 14.1 percent, and 8.1
percent respectively according to the Economic Survey (2002).
Potential filers are taken, following Comptroller and Auditor General
(2001), to be urban households with incomes above Rs 100,000 in
                                                       
13  See, for example, Erard and Feinstein (1994).
14 The CPIUNME is the best available price index given that agricultural
income is not subject to the income tax in India and the disproportionate
number of urban, in fact metropolitan, income tax assessees.14
2000-01 prices. Since the NCAER distribution is of households and
not  individuals, the data are not entirely consistent, though no
alternative is currently available. Details are in Table 1. The number
of individual filers with gross income exceeding Rs 100,000 is
estimated at 5.5 million and the total number of potential filers from
data in CAG (2001) is estimated at 33.5 million.
15 This suggests that
only 1 in 6 potential taxpayers actually file returns or an 83.5 percent
non-filer rate, somewhat lower than the 89 percent rate estimated by
Aggarwal (1991). This is consistent with the subsequent introduction
of the "1 in 6" scheme described above.
•  The value of s is taken to be 0.1 for non-salary earners, which was
the rate applicable to non-salary income in India in 2000-01. Non-
filing by salary earners is assumed to be zero as s = t, and non-filing
is, in practice, very limited.
•  The value of Z is taken to be Rs 20,000, which is twice the normal
per asset threshold for non-salary income.
•  Using estimates in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a), direct
compliance costs are assumed to be given by C1(RW) =
0.21914(RW)
0.77813. To take account of opportunity compliance costs
of non-filers, C2, it is assumed that C = C1 – C2 = 0.5C1. That is C =
C2 = 0.10957(RW)
0.77813 is assumed.
•  The value of R is taken to be the commercial bank 1 year term
deposit rate in 2000-01 of 9 percent.
•  It is assumed that 0 £ r £ 3R and that individuals have a uniform
distribution on the interval below R but a triangular distribution on the
interval above R at each level of formal income.
16 This implies that
exactly 50 percent of individuals have access to informal investment
opportunities yielding r ‡ 9 percent.
                                                       
15  In the third row in Table 1, the estimated number of filers exceed the
estimated number of households in 2000-01. While this is not inconsistent
if there is more than one filer per household, for the current exercise, the
number of non-filers is taken to be zero in the range.
16 This assumption may underestimate informal rates of return where
compound rates of 2 percent a month, or 26.8 percent a year, are not
uncommon. See Das-Gupta, Nayar and associates (1990).15
•  For detection probabilities, since subjective probabilities     determine
filing behaviour, the sample average in Chattopadhyay and Das-
Gupta (2002a), p = 23.28 percent, is taken. For case nf, p2 = 0.9p =
20.95 percent and for case g, p1 =  0.8p = 18.62 percent are
arbitrarily assumed.
•  For N, while the administrative penalty in the Income tax Act, 1961,
is Rs 5,000, this is not always levied given administrative discretion.
So a value equal to 80 percent of this or Rs 4000 is taken.
•  While the use of subjective probabilities is appropriate in calculations
of critical RW and r values, for expected non-filing costs, p1N and
p2N, objective probabilities must be used. Based on Das-Gupta and
Mookherjee (1998), it is assumed that p1 = p2 = 0.0005 (that is, 1 in
2000 non-filers are detected and penalised).
•  The penalty for concealment of income in Indian income tax law has
a maximum value of 300 percent of taxes sought to be evaded.
However, a 300 percent penalty is not always imposed and penalties
are frequently overturned on appeal. The effective value of  p,
therefore, is assumed to be 100 percent.
•  Since the actual number of filers in each income class, according to
data extrapolated from CAG (2001), is used in calculations, this
takes account of both filers induced to file in our model as well as
filers whose probability of detection of non-filing is high enough so
that they always file. As mentioned above, the latter class of filers
has not been taken account of in the formal model above.
With these assumptions, firstly, RW
g exceeds RW
f, so that all
individuals are predicted to be in zone  nt.  In other words, given the
assumed numerical parameters, the model suggests that neither TDS
nor non-filing penalties induce filing. Since the 1 in 6 scheme did induce
a substantial increase in filing, the exercise here underestimates the
opportunity cost of not filing due to foregone consumption benefits.
Consequently, our cost estimates for non-filers provide a lower bound to
actual costs.
At the base estimate, non-filer compliance costs work out to be
Rs 10888 million, of which Rs 7517 million is due to foregone16
consumption benefits, Rs 56 million is from expected non-filing penalties
and Rs 3315 million is due to the income loss from distorted investment.
This amounts to 3.4 percent of non-corporate income tax collections for
the year 2000-01. Though substantial and much higher than Income tax
Department administrative expenditure, these costs are dwarfed by
compliance costs of income tax filers, even with a 100 percent margin of
error.
17
Table 1:  Estimates of Household Income and Tax Returns Filed with
the Income Tax Department
NCAER estimates
for  1996-97
















































































* :  Rs 76,278 equals Rs 100,000 in 2001-02 rupees. So the range and number of
households is estimated at 50 percent of the income fraction (10-7.6278)/5, given an
exemption limit of Rs 50,000. Gross income is conservatively estimated to equal this
fraction of gross income between Rs 50,000 and Rs 100,000.
**: Adjusted for filers between Rs 200,000 to Rs 500,000.
# :  Projected from data for 1999-2000.
Source: Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a) based on CAG (2001) and computations.
                                                       
17 Estimated at around 49% of personal income tax collection by
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a).17
VI. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions
The model provides a framework for estimating the impact of
filing requirements on the misallocation of wealth. Investment distortions
occur when those who would have invested in either the formal or the
informal sector in the absence of TDS or filing compliance costs, are
induced to invest in the other sector. They can be identified by setting p =
p1, p2 = p1, and s = Z = C(RW) = 0 in equations (1) to (3).
18 This means
that, in the presence of TDS, a fraction of wealth, b0, is misallocated to
informal investment for Case g individuals. For Cases nt and f,
misallocation of resources depends on the size and direction of the shifts
of the rf locus and rnt, since the middle terms in both (2) and (3) drop out
while the third terms in both equations decrease.
The major policy suggestions emerging from this study, are, of
course, reducing filer compliance costs and increasing direct and indirect
non-filer penalties.
A second possible suggestion is the implementation of more
extensive TDS and lowering the TDS threshold where possible, provided
third party compliance costs do not thereby increase greatly, is likely to
be effective, though procedures to curb non-compliance by tax with-
holders will have to be instituted.
Increased efforts to improve the Permanent Account Number
(PAN) data base of the Income tax Department, first to increase its
coverage and second, to remove incorrect, duplicate and incomplete
records, may also prove effective. To do this improved usage of third
party information to identify potential taxpayers is important as suggested
by the criteria used by Aggarwal (1991) and the 1 in 6 scheme.
19
To the extent possible, final withholding taxes (s = t) could also
be considered to reduce the need for filing by those whose taxes are
                                                       
18 However, if the condition in (1) is not satisfied, b0 = 0.
19 A review of usage of third party information is in  Das-Gupta and
Mookherjee (1998).18
withheld. Other than this, standard prescriptions to reduce the incidence
of non-filing, through increased automation of citizens’ records and
improved use of third party information continue to remain valid.19
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